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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - PERSONS,
PLACES AND THINGS PROTECTED FROM SEARCH WITHOUT
A WARRANT
Though the people of the United States use more auto-
mobiles than the rest of the earth's population combined, the
law of search and seizure, with respect to vehicles has been
placed in the category of mooted questions by the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States
v. DiRe.2
D was found seated in a parked car by an investigator from
the Office of Price Administration and a detective from the
Buffalo, N. Y. police force. The officers had been led to the
car by information they received from R, a government in-
former, who told them he was going to buy counterfeit gaso-
line ration coupons from one B at a named place in the city of
Buffalo. The first knowledge the officers had of D's presence in
the car was when they found him seated beside B in the front
seat of the automobile. R was in the back seat with counter-
feit gasoline ration coupons in his hand. When he was asked
where he got them, he pointed to B.
The officers arrested all three of the car's occupants and
took them to the police station a few blocks away. At the sta-
tion, D complied with a direction to put the contents of his
pockets on a table. Several gasoline ration coupons which
proved to be counterfeit were laid out. D was then booked and
thoroughly searched. Several hundred counterfeit gasoline ra-
tion coupons were found on his person. Convicted of the mis-
demeanor of knowingly possessing counterfeit gasoline ration
coupons, D appealed, contending his arrest had been unlawful
and that the gasoline ration coupons should not have been ad-
mitted in evidence against him because they had been found
1 The law of search and seizure is derived from the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution: "The right of the people to be secure in thbir persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
2 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 212 (1948).
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
during the course of an unreasonable search and seizure.3
The government argued that officers have the right to search
a suspected car when they have reasonable grounds for believ-
ing it carries contraband and as an incident to such search
have the right to search the occupants of such car when .the
contraband sought is of a nature which could be concealed on
the person.,
The conviction was reversed in the circuit court," one judge
dissenting, on the ground that the arrest of D had been un-
lawful. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Jackson, upheld the circuit court's decision that the
arrest had been unlawful and overruled the government's
contention as to the right of officers to search occupants of a
suspected car. "By a parity of reasoning with that on which
the government disclaims the right to search occupants of a
house, we suppose the government would not contend that if it
had a valid search warrant for the car only it could search the
occupants as an incident to its execution. How then could we
say that the right to search a car without a warrant confers
greater latitude to search occupants than a search by warrant
would permit?" 6
The exceptions to the general rule of searches and seizures,
that no search is reasonable unless the scope of it is fixed, by
a disinterested magIstrateT are few and until recently have
a The federal courts enforce the Fourth Amendment by excluding evidence
obtained in violation of its provisions. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 29
L.Ed. 746, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261,
65 L.Ed. 647 (1921). Most state courts: decline to follow this viewpoint, includ-
ing North Dakota. State v. Pauley et al., 49 N.D. 488, 192 N.W. 91 (1923) ; State
v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N..W. 67 (1925); State v. Dinger, 51 N.D. 98, 199 N.W.
196 (1924);-People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). Wigmore com-
ments: "It there was ever any rule well settled (until the opinion in Boyd v.
United States), it was this, that an illegality in the mode of obtaining evidence
cannot Zzclude it, but must be redressed or punished or resisted by appropriate
proceedings otherwise taken." Wissots ON EvwDEmic, 3d ed., See. 2264 (2).
4 "it would seem that the Constitutional guaranties of the Fourth Amendment
would apply with more force to the person than to papers, houses and effects,
and so the courts have held. We apprehend that no court has ever upheld the
right of an officer to search the person except as an incident to a lawful arrest."
COaIesLIUS, SwCn AND Smzuae, 2d ed., See. 60 (45).
5 159 F. 2A 818 (1948).
6 382 U.S. 581, 587 (1948).
7 Agnello v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45- S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R.
790 (1925). "The fair implication of the constitution is that no search of prem-
ises, as such, is reasonable except the cause for it be approved, the limits of it be
fixed, and the scope of it particularly determined by a disinterested magistrate."
Jackson, J., dissenting in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S 145, 91 L.Ed, 1399,
67 S.Ct. 1098 (1946).
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been rigidly circumscribed. There have been three major ex-
ceptions: (1) the person may be searched as an incident of a
lawful arrest; 8 (2) the living quarters of an arrested person
when he is arrested at home may be searched as an incident to
the arrest;9 and (3) it has been held that automobiles and
other vehicles may be searched without a warrant when the
officers concerned have reasonable grounds - i. e. "probable
cause" o - for believing they carry contraband.
It is the third exception noted above which the Supreme
Court has now placed in the realm of open questions. The ex-
ception itself arose from the famous case of CarroU v. United
States.". In that case, the Supreme Court held valid a search
in which officers stopped an automobile which they had rea-
sonable grounds to believe carried bootleg liquor, searched the
vehicle and arrested the occupants after liquor had been found
hidden in the car.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Carroll Case turned in
part upon a question of statutory interpretation. The officers
in that case were engaged in enforcing the National Prohibi-
tion (Volstead) Act, which specified that officers should
"seize" 12 all contraband liquor when it was -discovered in a
vehicle.
After citing several statutes concerned mainly with revenue
and custom matters providing for searches of vehicles sus-
8 Note 4, supra.
9 This appears to be basically an extension of the search of the person allowed
during a lawful arrest. In Harris v. United States, supra, note 7, a case widely
discussed by the legal writers, D was arrested on charges growing out of a forged
check, the arrest being in his apartment. The officers spent five hours going over
the entire apartment, finding at the end of that time evidence which resulted in
D's conviction on a different charge than that on which he was arrested. It was
held a legal search, Justices Frankfurter, Murphy and Jackson dissenting.
10" 'Probable cause' is synonymous with reasonable cause. It means a reason-
able ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in them-
selves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that grounds exist for the search,
or that the person sought has committed a felony, or such a state of facts as would
lead a man to believe, or to entertain a strong suspicion, that property is pos-
sessed subject to a forfeiture, or that a person has committed a felony. Probable
cause does not mean prima facie evidence of guilt." United States v. Keown, 19 F.
Supp. 639 (1937).
11267 U.S, 182, 69 L.Ed. 548, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1924).
12 *'When . . .any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of
transporting, in violation of the law, intoxicating liquor in any wagon, buggy,
automobile or water or air craft or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any
and all intoxicating liquor found therein being transported contrary to law.
Whenever intoxicating liquors transported or possessed illegally shall be seized
by an officer he shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat,
air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in ehurge
thereof." 27 U.S.C.A., See. 40.
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pected of being used for smuggling," the Supreme Court stated
in the Carroll Case: "We have made a somewhat extended
reference to these statutes to show that the guaranty of free-
dom from unreasonable searches and seizures -by. the Fourth
Amendment lias been construed, practically since the begin-
ning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other struc-
ture, in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may
be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought." 14
". . . On reason and authority, the true rule is that if the
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable
cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circum-
stances known to the seizing officers, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction, the search and seizures are valid.""
In another passage, the court said: "The intent of Congress",
to make a distinction between the necessity for a search war-
rant in the searching of a private dwelling and in that of auto-
mobiles or other road vehicles is... clearly established ...,,,
It was on this element in the Carroll Case - the emphasis
upon the "intent of Congress" that such searches and seizures
should be lawful - that Justice Jackson fastened in question-
ing the rule of Carroll v. United States. supra, in the DiRe
Case.
Jackson posed the. problem this way: "Obviously the Court
should be reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized by
Congress was unreasonable and that the Act was therefore
unconstitutional. In view of the strong presumption of consti-
tutionality due to an Act of Congress, especially when it turns
is "Insofar as the stoppage of a vehicle is concerned, there is a difference in
the very nature of a revenue or custom statute aimed to prevent snuggling of
foreign goods into the country and a 'police' measure aimed at illegal transporta.
tion of liquor within the country .... But no constitutional authority can be cited
for such a summary procedure when applied to motorists driving within the
boundaries of the United States on a public highway." Black, A Critique of the
Carroll Cam, 29 COL. L Rxv. 1068 (1929).
14267 U.S. 182, 153 (1924).
10267 U.S. 132, 149 (1924).
10 Italics supplied.
11267 U.S. 182, 147 (1924).
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on what is 'reasonable,' the Carroll decision falls short of es-
tablishing a doctrine that, without such legislation, auto-
mobiles nonetheless are subject to search without warrant in
enforcement of all federal statutes. This Court has never yet
said so. The most that can be said is that some of the language
by which the Court justified the search and seizure legisla-
tion in the Carroll Case might be used to make a distinction
between what is a reasonable search as applied to an auto-
mobile and as applied to a residence of fixed premises, even
in absence of legislation." 18
While the problem thus presented by United States v. DiRe,
supra, does not approach in importance the controversy en-
gendered by such decisions as Harris v. United States, supra,
(note 7), the wisdom of the Carroll rule has been questioned
by several writers. Forrest R. Black, in "A Critique of the Car-
roll Case," ,0 stated: "The mere fact that there is a difference
in the law relating to the search of a dwelling and an auto-
mobile does not of itself justify the seizure or arrest in the
Carroll type of case. The real question is, 'What is the nature
of the difference? Is the difference of such a character that
it will justify a search without warrant based on probable
cause?' ,-20
The objection to the Carroll rule noted by several legal
writers is this: that the right of search thus conferred on
officers of the law is broader in many cases than the right of
the officers to arrest.
In the search of an automobile, the vast majority of cases
involve the problem of an arrest of the car's occupant at a
practically contemporaneous time. The law of search and
seizure then becomes involved with the right of the officers
to arrest without warrant. It is in this relationship between the
law of search and the law of arrest that one of the basic prob-
lems of search and seizure with respect to automobiles emerges.
At common law the rule was that an officer might -arrest
without warrant where he had reasonable grounds for be-
lieving a felony had been committed. As to misdemeanors,
however, the officer could arrest without warrant only for a
breach of the peace committed in his presence, although there
1s 332 U.S. 581, 585 (1948).
10 Note 13, supra.
20 Ibid. at 1096.
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is some authority holding he could also arrest for any misde-
meanor committed in his presence.21
Under most state statutes, an officer has the right to arrest
for a misdemeanor committed in his presence without a war-
rant. A few states still restrict the officer's right of arrest
without warrant to misdemeanors committed in his presence
which amount to a breach of the peace. 22 In the absence of
applicable federal legislation, federal officers must arrest in
accordance with the law of the state in which they find the per-
son to be arrested. 2
In New York, where the DiRe Case originated, officers are
not allowed to arrest without a warrant on suspicion that a
person has committed a misdemeanor. This is ,also the rule in
North Dakota.."
It may be put as a general holding, then, that officers may
not arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not committed
in their presence. This rule is generally subject to modifica-
tion by statute, although on the other hand, some courts have
held statutes conferring such powers upon police officers to be
unconstitutional."
How does this general rule of arrests apply to the rule of
Carroll v. United States?
To illustrate, let us consider a hypothetical case. D emerges
from a store carrying a parcel wrapped in heavy paper and
begins to walk down the street. Across the way, two federal
officers are watching him. They have probable cause for be-
lieving that D has committed the misdemeanor of, for example,
purchasing unrationed butter without stamps in wartime.
The package itself might in fact contain anything; the heavy
wrapping prevents the officers from actually seeing what is
contained in the parcel.
2t A.L.I. Code Crim. Procedure, tentative draft, comment, See. 21; p. 148.
22AJ... Code Crim. Procedure, tentative draft, See. 21.
23 United States v. DiRe, supra.
2 4 See. 177, N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure; See. 29-0615, N.D. Rev. Code
(1948).
25 In Re Kellam, 55 Kan. 700, 41 P. 960 (1895); Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78
Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1889) ; Polk v. State, 142 So. 480, 167 Miss. 506 (1932);
Orick v. State, 105 So. 465, 140 Miss. 184, 41 A.L.R. 1129 (1925); Ex Parte Jones,
208 S.W. 525, 84 Tex. Cr. 497 (1919); Ex Parte Rhodes, 79 So. 462, 202 Ala. 68, 1.
A.LR. 568 (1918).
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Now, what are the rights of the parties in a state having
normal rules of arrest? The officers cannot arrest D because he
has not committed a misdemeanor in their presence.26 But this
applies only so long as D continues on foot. D now elects to
drive. He comes to his parked automobile and gets in, placing
the parcel on the seat beside him. The officers may now ap-
proach the vehicle, order D to get out, and search the auto-
mobile, since they have "probable cause," as already noted, for
believing that the automobile contains contraband. Once the
butter is found, D has been caught in the presence of the of-
ficers committing a misdemeanor. He may now be formally
arrested, tried and convicted. Yet in actual fact, what has
happened is that the officers have done two things the law
generally condemns: they have made an exploratory search
for evidence 7 and they have arrested a man on evidence ob-
tained by making such a search.
Had the officers arrested D before the search, it now becomes
clear, the arrest would have been illegal and the search invalid.
United States v. DiRe, supra. Since the officers have been care-
ful to search first and arrest afterward, the arrest is legal and
the search is valid.
When a reason is sought for this anomaly, one is brought
back inexorably to the 'reason advanced in the Carroll Case,
that the search is valid and "reasonable" because of the dif-
ference between an automobile and other forms of property.
It is clear, of course, that the basic pattern for the procedure
of search preceding arrest was set by Section 26 of the Vol-
stead Act, 2 which provides for the seizure of contraband li-
quor (necessarily preceded by a search for it) and arrest fol-
lowing the seizure of the liquor. And the Volstead Act, pre-
26 To be committing a misdemeanor in the "presence" of the officers, D would
have to be carrying the illegal butter openly so that they could detect it by their
senses. Thus,-it is generally held that an officer has no right to arrest a person
carrying a concealed weapon unless he can 4etect the weapon through the use of
his senses. "If the weapon or evidence of crime is not visible to the officer, and he
has no definite information as to whether or not such person has such weapon or
such other property, or if the arrest is made upon mere conjecture on the officer's
part that such person may have such a weapon, then ... the arrest and incidental
search Is illegal." CORNELUS, SZARCa AND SCIZUR, See. 60, 45..
27 "The famous case of Entick v. Carrington, 95 E.R. 807 (1765), is 4 landmark
in English law. It decided two things: (1) that general search warrants were
void for uncertainty; (2) that any search to obtain evidence was illegaL" Legal
Searck and Arrest Under th'e Eighteenths Amendment, 32 Y.L.J. 490 (1928).
28 Note 12, supra.
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sumably with the procedure it legalized, has been defunct for
many years.
It follows that the question may be stated this way: Is the
mobility of the automobile a sufficient reason 2 to allow search
on reasonable cause - inevitably ending in an arrest - in the
case of misdemeanors? It is not suggested that where the
officer has reasonable grounds for believing a felony has been
committed he should be prevented from searching. Indeed,
using the principle that one may search those things found in
an arrested person's possession, the officer does not need to
invoke the assistance of the Carroll rule. He may arrest upon
probable cause alone and thereafter search the automobile as
an incident to the arrest.'
But why should such a result be permitted in the case of
misdemeanors? The express policy of the law has been to pro-
hibit arrests upon mere suspicion that a misdemeanor has beencommitted. As already stated, more than one court has held
a law conferring such powers on an officer unconstitutional.'-
It might be noted that this view of the matter would ap-
pear to be supported by federal statute, since Congress has
made unlawful search by federal officers a misdemeanor in
itself, but has provided that it should not apply to one "arrest-
ing or attempting to arrest any person committing or attempt-
ing to commit an offense in the presence 32 of such officer, agent
or employe, or who has committed, or who is suspected on
reasonable grounds of having committed, a felony." '-
Black puts the matter this way: "Are we to conclude that
Congress intended the right of seizure to be broader than the
right of arrest, and realizing this distinction thereby directed
prohibition officers to seize first and arrest afterwards? It was
on this point that there was the clearest clash between the
majority and the dissent (in the Carroll Case) and the ma-
jority admitted that if the dissent's interpretation had been
sound, its conclusion would have been sound. The fact remains
that if you construe and defend the Carroll Case as one of
20 Cf. the dissenting opinions in Moore v. State, 138 Miss. 116, 103 So. 483
f1926) ; Park v. United States, 294 F. 776 (1924).
30 This would follow under the rule of Harris v. United States, note 9, supra.
31 Note 25, supra.
3- See, on this proposition, note 26, supra.
: 49 Stat. 877, 18 U.S. C. Sec. 53a, 18 U.S.C.A. See. 53a.
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search, seizure and arrest, you have gone far toward a justi-
fication of the exploratory search. 34
It remains to consider three cases arising since the DiRe
decision. In United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Auto-
mobile,85 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held valid a
search of an automobile upon probable cause, specifically at-
tempting to reaffirm the rule of the Carroll Case. The case
arose when officers of the Alcohol Tax Unit received informa-
tion that one McGee was going to make a delivery of tax un-
paid alcohol in Chicago. The investigators halted the car upon
the streets, and while one of them was talking to McGee, the
other opened the car door, tore open the cartons in the rear
seat, and found they contained cans of untaxed alcohol. McGee
was then arrested and in a criminal proceeding collateral to
this case was indicted apparently s for violation of Section
3321 (b) (1) (3) Title 26, U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Code, a felony.
He subsequently moved to suppress evidence and his mo-
tion was granted, the government dismissing the criminal pro-
ceedings against him. Thereupon, the government instituted
forfeiture proceedings against the car and it was in this civil
action against McGee's automobile that the court made its
holding with respect to search and seizure.
In United States v. Nichols,37 D was arrested after a search
of his car - again on probable cause -. revealed tax unpaid
alcohol. He was indicted on two counts, for violation of Sec-
tion 2803, 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Code, and also for viola-
tion of Section 3321, 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Code, the same
section involved in United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan
Automobile, supra. The indictments were for felonies. The
court upheld the search and seizure of the contents of the
automobile, again ostensibly on the theory of the Carroll Case.
In Commonwealth v. Chaplin,8 a Kentucky decision, a pre-
cisely opposite result was reached. In that case, officers
34 Black, A Critique of the Carroll Case, 29 CoL. L. Rzv. 1068, 1081, 1082
(1929).
a1 167 F. 2d 8 (1948).
116 The opinion in this case fails to give the precise nature of the criminal
charges against McGee, but the forfeiture proceedings against the automobile
were also based upon the violation of Sec. 3321 (b) (1) (3). 26 U.S.C.A., and
srew out of the same set of facts.
37 78 F. Supp. 483 (1948).
38307 Ky. 680, 211 S.W. 2d, 841 (1948).
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searched an automobile on probable cause for believing that it
contained liquor being transported into local option terri-
tory. This was a misdemeanor. The court put its holding on
this ground: "Probable cause for seizure cannot be searched
for by police officers and left for them to determine, for the
Constitution provides for the intervention of judicial determin-
ation of probable cause. The protection afforded by section
ten P of our constitution consists in requiring that probable
cause for searching any place or seizing any person or thing
shall be determined by a neutral judicial officer instead of by
the often overzealous police or enforcement officer."
Consider first the two federal cases. In both, the arrests
were for felonies. As has been pointed out, officers have the
right to arrest for felonies on probable cause. It would appear
then that neither of these two cases rests upon a factual situ-
ation similar to that in Carroll v. United States, supra, where
the arrest was for a misdemeanor. The searches in the two fed-
eral. cases were both incidental to arrests for felonies. If these
cases are looked at from the viewpoint of the law'-of arrest,
it would appear that they-can be distinguished from Carroll
v. United States and are not therefore solid authority.
Commonwealth v. Chaplin, supra, is thus apparently correct
in its holding: since the officers had no authority to arrest D
without seeing him commit a misdemeanor in their presence,
it logically followed that they had no right to search -D's car
to obtain the evidence on which to arrest him.40
It is suggested that the reason behind the Carroll rule no
longer exists. At the time of the Carroll Case and for several
years thereafter, the federal government faced a law enforce-
ment problem of almost insuperable proportions. The repeal of
the Eighteenth Amendment, however, has substantially ended
the problem which called forth the legislation authorizing such
searches. The Carroll rule may have been eminently reason-
39 Substantially similar to the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
40 "The Supreme Court in the Gouled case (note 3, supra), said of the bill of
rights, 'It has been repeatedly decided that these amendments should receive a
liberal construction so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or gradual de-
preciation of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or
by well intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers.' The Carroll
Case violates this principle. The majority of the court .. ; attempting to empha-
size the distinction between the right of search and seizure of dwellings-and auto-
mobiles with a warrant, has in effect denaturized the Fourth Amendment as to
everything except the word 'houses.' The eloquent defense by the court of the
'right of castle' is fustian. It affords no comfort to Carroll or the motoring
public." Black, A Critique of the CarroU Case, note 13, supra.
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able in.1925, but is it "reasonable" in 1949?
Actually, though clearly distinguishable on their facts, the
DiRe Case and the Carroll Case present practically reverse sit-
uations when reduced to their common ftctors. In the C(arro/l
Case, the officers searched, then seized, then arrested. In the
DiRe Case, the officers arrested, then searched, then seized.
The Supreme Court unhesitatingly held the procedure illegal
in the DiRe Case. A fortiori it would appear that when the
officer must first search for his evidence before he can make
an arrest for a misdemeanor, the arrest should be held invalid.
CHARLES CRUM
SECOND YEAR LAW STUDENT
